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Abstract—A shared read/write register emulation provides the
illusion of shared-memory on top of message-passing models.
The main hurdle with such emulations is dealing with server
faults in the system. Several crash-tolerant register emulations
in static systems require algorithms to replicate the value of the
shared register onto a majority of servers. Majority correctness
is necessary for such emulations. Byzantine faults are considered
to be the worst kind of faults that can happen in any distributed
system. Emulating a Byzantine-tolerant register requires replicat-
ing the register value on to more than two-thirds of the servers.
Emulating a register in a dynamic system where servers and
clients can enter and leave the system and be faulty is harder
than in static systems. There are several crash-tolerant register
emulations for dynamic systems.
This paper presents the first emulation of a multi-reader multi-
writer atomic register in a system that can withstand nodes
continually entering and leaving, imposes no upper bound on the
system size and can tolerate Byzantine servers. The algorithm
works as long as the number of servers entering and leaving
during a fixed time interval is at most a constant fraction α of
the system size at the beginning of the interval, and as long as the
number of Byzantine servers in the system is at most f . Although
our algorithm requires that there be a constant known upper
bound on the number of Byzantine servers, this restriction is
unavoidable, as we show that it is impossible to emulate an atomic
register if the system size and maximum number of servers that
can be Byzantine in the system is unknown to the nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
A long-standing vision in distributed systems is to build
reliable systems from unreliable components. We are increas-
ingly dependent on services provided by distributed systems
resulting in added vulnerability when it comes to failures
in computer systems. In a dependable computing system,
the term “Byzantine” fault is used to represent the worst
kind of failures imaginable. Malicious attacks, operator mis-
takes, software errors and conventional crash faults are all
encompassed by the term Byzantine faults [22]. The growing
reliance of industry and government on distributed systems
and increased connectivity to the Internet exposes systems to
malicious attacks. Operator mistakes are also a very common
cause of Byzantine faults [30]. The growth in the size of
software in general leads to an increased number of software
errors. Naturally, over the past four decades, there has been a
significant work on consensus and replication techniques that
tolerate Byzantine faults [4], [14], [15], [22] as it promises
dependable systems that can tolerate any type of bad behavior.
The shared-memory model is a more convenient programming
model than message-passing, and shared register emulations
provide the illusion of shared-memory on top of message-
passing models.
In this paper, we emulate the first Byzantine-tolerant
atomic register on top of a dynamic message-passing
system that never stops changing.
A. Related Work
Typically, crash-tolerant emulations [6], [24] of a shared
read/write register replicate the value of the register in multiple
servers and require readers and writers to communicate with
majority of servers. For instance, the ABD emulation [6]
replicates the value of the shared register in a static set of
servers. It assumes that a minority of the servers may fail by
crashing. This problem of emulating a shared register has been
extended to static systems with servers subject to Byzantine
faults and these emulations typically assume that two-thirds [7]
or three-fourths [1] of the servers are non-faulty. It is shown
in [29] that more than two-third correctness is necessary
for Byzantine-tolerant register simulation. Byzantine quorum
systems (BQS) [4], [26], [27], [29] are a well known tool
for ensuring consistency and availability of a shared register.
A BQS is a collection of subsets of servers, each pair of
which intersect in a set containing sufficiently many correct
servers to guarantee consistency of the replicated register as
seen by clients. Vukolic [33] provides an extensive overview
of the evolution of quorum systems for distributed storage and
consensus. Dantas et. al [16] present a comparative evaluation
of several Byzantine quorum based storage algorithms in the
literature.
The success of this replicated approach for static systems,
where the set of readers, writers, and servers is fixed, has
motivated several similar emulations for dynamic systems,
where nodes may enter and leave. Change in system com-
position due to nodes entering and leaving is called churn.
Ko et. al [19] provide a detailed discussion of churn behavior
in practice. Most existing emulations of atomic registers in
dynamic systems deal with crash-faults and rely either on
the assumption that churn eventually stops for a long enough
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
06
71
6v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  1
3 O
ct 
20
19
period (e.g., DynaStore [2] and RAMBO [25]) or on the
assumption that the system size is bounded (e.g., [10], [12]).
Attiya et al. [8], [9] proposed an emulation of a crash-tolerant
shared register in a system that does not require churn to ever
stop. Bonomi et al. [13] present an emulation of a server
based regular read/write storage in a synchronous message-
passing system that is subject to “mobile Byzantine failures”.
They prove that the problem is impossible to solve in an
asynchronous setting. The system size, however, is fixed and
mobility, in this paper refers to the Byzantine agents that can
be moved from server to server. Baldoni et al. [11] provide the
first emulation of a Byzantine-tolerant safe [21] register in an
eventually synchronous system with churn but the size of the
system is upper bounded by a known parameter. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no work on implementing an atomic
register in a (i) dynamic system (ii) with no upper bound on
the system size where (iii) servers are subject to Byzantine
faults and (iv) any number of clients can crash.
B. Contributions
The first contribution of this paper is the first algorithm to
emulate an atomic multi-reader/multi-writer register that does
not require churn to ever stop, does not have an upper bound
on the system size and tolerates up to a constant number of
Byzantine servers in the system. It is a common practice to
assume that clients cannot be Byzantine in a system [11],
[28] as a Byzantine client can maliciously contact separate
sets of servers and write different values which results in an
inconsistent register thus violating safety. In our model, clients
can only crash.
Although our algorithm requires that there be a constant
known upper bound on the number of Byzantine servers that
can be tolerated, this restriction is unavoidable as shown in
our second contribution. Our second contribution a proof that
it is impossible to emulate an atomic register in a system
with churn if the maximum number of Byzantine servers is
unknown to the nodes.
Our system model is similar to the one in [9]. We assume
that there exists a parameter D, an upper bound, unknown
to the nodes, on the delay of any message (between correct
nodes). There is no lower bound on message delays and nodes
do not have real-time clocks.
Churn is modeled as follows: we assume that in any time
interval of length D, the number of servers that enter or
leave the system is at most a constant fraction, α (known
to all nodes), of the number of servers in the system at the
beginning of the interval. We also assume the messages are au-
thenticated with digital signatures [23]. In real world systems
digital signatures in messages are implemented using public-
key signatures [31] and message authentication codes [32].
Intuitively, this means that Byzantine servers cannot lie about
the sender of a message.
C. Challenges with Byzantine Servers
Our algorithm is called ABCC register, for Atomic
Byzantine-tolerant Continuous Churn. Unlike crash faults, data
may easily be corrupted by Byzantine servers by sending old
information, modified information or even different informa-
tion to different sets of nodes while replying to a particular
message. A Byzantine server may choose to not reply to a
message at all, even if it is active or it may even choose to
reply to a single message multiple times. Our algorithm uses a
mechanism where at every stage of the algorithm, nodes wait
for at least f+1 replies from distinct servers before taking any
major steps, to make sure at least one reply from a non-faulty
server was received. The algorithm also has to make sure that
a decision is not affected by multiple replies corresponding
to a single message from Byzantine servers. A Byzantine
server can also “lie” about its joined state and propagate
misinformation by sending out messages after “pretending”
to leave the system.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We model each node p, whether client or server, as a state
machine with a set of states. The set of states for p contains
two initial states, sip and s
`
p. Initial state s
i
p is used if node p
is in the system initially, whereas s`p is used if p enters the
system later.
State transitions are triggered by the occurrences of events.
Possible triggering events include node p entering the system
(ENTERp), leaving the system (LEAVEp), and receiving a
message m (RECEIVEp(m)). In addition, triggering events for
a client p include the invocation of an operation (READp or
WRITEp(v)) and the client crashing (CRASHp).
A step of a node p is a 5-tuple (s′, T,m,R, s), where s′ is
the old state, T is the triggering event, m is the message to be
sent, R is either a response (RETURNp(v), ACKp, or JOINEDp)
or ⊥, and s is the new state. The message m includes an
indication as to whether it should be sent to all servers or
to all clients, indicated as “s-bcast” or “c-bcast”. RETURNp
is the response to READp, ACKp is the response to WRITEp,
and JOINEDp is the response to ENTERp; these responses are
only done by clients. If T is CRASHp, then m and R are both
⊥.
If the values of m, R, and s are determined by the node’s
transition function applied to s′ and T , then the step is said to
be valid. A step by a client is always valid. In an invalid step
(taken by server p), the values of m, R, and s can be arbitrary,
with the restriction that p cannot modify values containing
information about node ids. There is more detail on how this
assumptions applies to our algorithm in Section IV.
A view of a node p is a sequence of steps such that:
• the old state of the first step is an initial state;
• the new state of each step equals the old state of the next
step
• if the old state of the first step is sip, then no ENTERp
event occurs
• if the old state of the first step is s`p, then the triggering
event of the first step is ENTERp and there is no other
occurrence of ENTERp;
• at most one LEAVEp occurs, and if it occurs there are no
later steps;
• at most one CRASHp occurs; if it occurs, then p is a client
and there are no later steps.
A view is valid if every step in it is valid.
In our model, a node that leaves the system cannot re-enter
and a client node that crashes cannot recover.
Time is represented by nonnegative real numbers. A timed
view is a view whose steps are labeled with nondecreasing
times (the real times when the steps occur) such that:
• for each node p, if the old state in p’s first step is sip,
then the time of p’s first step is 0 (such a node is said to
be in the system initially), and
• if a view is infinite, the step times must increase without
bound.
Given a timed view of a node p, if (s′, T,m,R, s) is the
step with the largest time less than or equal to t, then s is the
state of p at time t. A node is said to be present at time t if its
first step has time at most t but has not left (i.e., LEAVEp does
not occur at or before time t). The number of servers present
at time t is denoted by NS(t). A node is said to be active
at time t if it is present at t and CRASHp has not occurred
before time t. Since servers never experience crashes, a server
that is present is also active.
We define the following system parameters that are used in
the upcoming definition of an execution:
• D > 0 is the maximum message delay (the delay of a
message sent at time t and received at time t′ is t′ − t).
• α > 0 is the churn rate, which bounds how fast servers
can enter and leave; there are no bounds for clients.
• f ≥ 1 is the maximum number of Byzantine-faulty
servers.
• NSmin > 0 is the minimum number of servers. This
value is unknown to all nodes in the system.
The parameters α and f are known to the nodes, but D is not.
An execution is a possibly infinite set of timed views, one
for each node that is ever present in the system, that satisfies
the following assumptions:
A1: For all t ≥ 0, the number of nodes present at time t is
finite and NS(t) ≥ NSmin.
A2: Every message s-bcast (respectively, c-bcast) has at most
one matching receipt at each server (respectively, client)
and every message receipt has exactly one matching
bcast.
A3: If message m is s-bcast (respectively, c-bcast) at time t
and server (respectively, client) node q is active through-
out [t, t + D], then q receives m. The delay of every
received message is in (0, D].
A4: Messages from the same sender are received in the order
they are sent (i.e., if node p sends message m1 before
sending message m2, then no node receives m2 before it
receives m1).
A5: For all times t > 0, the number of ENTER and LEAVE
events for servers in [t, t+D] is at most α ·NS(t).
A6: The timed view of every client is valid. A client p whose
timed view does not contain CRASHp is a correct client.
There is a set F of servers, with |F | ≤ f , such that
the timed view of every server not in F is valid. The
servers not in F are correct servers. The servers in F are
Byzantine-faulty.
A7: If a READp or WRITEp invocation occurs at time t, then
p is an active client that has already joined (JOINp occurs
before t). (no LEAVEp or CRASHp occurs by time t).
A8: At each client node p, no READp or WRITEp occurs until
there have been responses to all previous READp and
WRITEp invocations.
Assumption A1 states that the system size is always finite
and there is always some minimum number of servers in
the system. Assumptions A2 through A4 model a reliable
broadcast communication service that provides nodes with a
mechanism to send the same message to all servers or to all
clients in the system with message delays in (0, D]. However,
Byzantine servers may choose not to s-bcast (respectively, c-
bcast) the same message to every server/client in the system
and just send different unicast messages to different nodes
in the system. Assumption A5 bounds the server churn.
Assumption A6 bounds the number of Byzantine-faulty servers
and restricts the clients to experience only crash failures.
Assumptions A7 and A8 ensure that operations are only
invoked by joined and active clients and at, any time, at most
one operation is pending at each client node.
We consider an algorithm to be correct if every execution
of the algorithm satisfies the following conditions :
C1: For every client p that is in the system initially, JOINEDp
does not occur. Every client p that enters the system later
and does not leave or crash eventually joins.
C2: In the view of each client p, ignoring message-receipt
events, each READp or WRITEp is immediately followed
by either LEAVEp, CRASHp, or a matching response
(RETURNp or ACKp), and each RETURNp or ACKp is
immediately preceded by a matching invocation (READp
or WRITEp).
C3: The read and write operations are atomic (also called
linearizable) [18], [20], [21]: there is an ordering of
all completed reads and writes and some subset of the
uncompleted writes such that every read returns the value
of the latest preceding write (or the initial value of the
register if there is no preceding write) and, if an operation
op1 finishes before another operation op2 begins, then op1
occurs before op2 in the ordering.
It is the responsibility of the algorithm to complete joins, reads
and writes, and choose the right values for the reads, as long
as Assumptions A1–A8 are satisfied.
Although our model places an upper bound on message de-
lays, it does not place any lower bound on the message delays
or on local computation times. Moreover, nodes cannot access
clocks to measure the passage of real time. Consequently, the
well-known consensus problem is unsolvable in our model as
proved in [9], just as it is unsolvable in a model with no
upper bound on message delays [17].
III. IMPOSSIBILITY OF A UNIFORM ALGORITHM WITH
BYZANTINE SERVERS
In this section we show it is impossible to emulate an atomic
register in our system model if nodes have no information
about the maximum number of Byzantine-faulty servers or
about the total number of servers. We model the lack of
such information through the notion of a “uniform” algorithm.
There have been similar results proved for the impossibility of
self-stabilization [5] and consensus [3] in Byzantine-tolerant
systems with unknown participants.
An algorithm is called uniform if the code run by every
node is independent of both the system size and the maximum
number of Byzantine servers in the system. Thus in a uniform
algorithm, for any particular node id p, there are only two
possible state machines that p can have. One is for the situation
when p is in the system initially and the other is for the
situation when p enters the system later. Otherwise, the state
machines are completely independent of the initial size of
the system (or the size when p enters) and of the maximum
number of Byzantine servers.
Theorem 1. It is impossible to emulate an atomic1 read/write
register in our model with a uniform algorithm.
Proof. Suppose in contradiction, there is a uniform algorithm,
A, which simulates an atomic register and can tolerate f
Byzantine server failures for any f ∈ N+, as long as the
system size at all times is at least NSmin(f) for some function
NSmin. Consider the following executions of A.
Execution e1: The maximum number of Byzantine servers
is 1. The set of servers in the system initially is S1, where
|S1| = NSmin(1), and all servers are correct. All message
delays are D. The initial value of the simulated register is v.
A new client p enters the system at time te and joins by time
tj ≥ te. Client p invokes a read on the simulated register at
time tr > tj . No other operation on the simulated register
is invoked. By assumed correctness of algorithm A, the read
invoked by p returns v at some time t′r ≥ tr.
Execution e′1: Multiply the real time of every event in e1 by
min{Dt′r , 1}. As a result, all events in the time interval [0, t
′
r]
in e1 are compressed into the interval [0, D] in e′1.
Execution e2: The maximum number of Byzantine servers
is f2 = |S1|. The set of servers in the system initially is S2,
where |S2| = NSmin(f2)and S1 is a subset of S2.
Note that the system sizes are chosen such that we have
execution e1 with |S1| servers, all correct, and execution e2
with exactly |S1| Byzantine servers.
There is at least one client in the system initially. All
message delays are D. The initial value of the simulated
register is v. No churn happens in this execution. Client q
that was in the system at time 0 invokes a write of v′ 6= v at
time tw. By the assumed correctness of algorithm A, the write
completes at some time t′w ≥ tw. No other operation on the
simulated register is invoked.
Finally we construct a prefix e3 of a new execution from
executions e′1 and e2. First, we specify a set of timed views
and then we show that this set indeed forms the prefix of an
1This theorem and proof holds for a safe [21] register as well
execution. Let e13 be the set of timed views in e2. Note that
e13 includes the write operation invoked by client q. Truncate
each timed view in e13 immediately after the latest step with
associated time at most t′w, i.e., just after the write by client
q finishes. Then append steps that result in the immediate
delivery of all messages that are in transit at t′w. Call the
resulting set of timed views e23. Construct e3 from e
2
3 as
follows.
Execution prefix e3: Add to the set the prefix of the timed
view of client p from e′1 that ends at time D, but change the
time associated with each step by adding t′w to it. For each
server s in S1, append the prefix of s’s timed view in e′1 that
ends at time D, but change the time associated with each step
by adding t′w to it. Append nothing to the timed views for the
remaining nodes (client or server).
The idea behind e3 is to have all the nodes behave correctly
through q’s write of v′, and then have a new client p enter,
join, and invoke a read during which time it communicates
only with the servers in S1. However, the servers in S1 are
Byzantine and start acting as they did in e′1, causing p’s read
to incorrectly return the value v, instead of v′. An important
technicality in the construction of e3 is to adjust the time
of steps taken from e′1. The assumed uniform nature of the
algorithm is what allows us to combine timed views from e1,
in which at most one server can be Byzantine, with timed
views from e2, in which f2 > 1 servers can be Byzantine.
In order for the existence of the incorrect read by p in e3 to
contradict the assumed correctness of A, we must show that
e3 is the prefix of an execution (otherwise, bad behavior by
A is irrelevant).
We show that e3 is a prefix of an execution by verifying
properties A1 through A8. A1, A5, and A6–A8 are clear.
A2–A4: Every message sent by a node (client or server) has
exactly one matching receipt. We show this in two parts: (i) If
the message was sent before t′w, it was either delivered before
t′w (from e2) or at t
′
w if it was pending at t
′
w (from construction
of e3). (ii) If the message was sent after t′w: Messages
exchanged between p and S1 after t′p are all delivered within
D time (from e′1) and all other messages in e3 after t
′
w are
delivered with delay D. All message delays in e′1 are ≤ D
and the message delays in e2 are D. Therefore, the message
delays in e3 are at most D.
In e3, p’s read returns v, whereas the latest preceding write
wrote v′ 6= v. The value returned by node p is incorrect and
as e3 is the prefix of an execution, this violates the safety
property of the register. Therefore, it is impossible to simulate
a shared register in dynamic systems where new nodes entering
have no information about the system size and no information
on the maximum number of Byzantine servers present in the
system.
IV. THE ABCC ALGORITHM
The ABCC algorithm is loosely based on the algorithm
in [9] along with modifications to accommodate the new
client-server model, as opposed to the peer-to-peer model, and
Byzantine servers as opposed to crashes in [9]. The ABCC
algorithm is divided into two main parts: Algorithm 1 for
servers and Algorithm 2 for clients. Algorithm 3 contains a
set of common procedures used by both servers and clients.
The server algorithm contains a mechanism for tracking the
composition of the system with respect to servers and for
assisting clients with reads and writes. The client algorithm
is for newly entered clients to join the system and for joined
clients to read from and write to the shared register.
Initially the system consists of a set of servers S0 and a
set of clients C0 such that |S0| ≥ NSmin and |C0| ≥ 0.
A server p ∈ S0 is joined at time 0 and it knows about
all other servers q ∈ S0. In the following code description,
we use the convention that local variables of node p are
subscripted with p. Each node p maintains a set of events,
Server Changesp, concerning the servers that have entered,
joined and left the system. A node p also maintains the
set Presentp that stores information about servers that have
entered, but have not left, as far as p knows. A server p is
called a member if it has joined the system but not left. Client
p maintains the derived variable Membersp of servers that p
considers as members. The variables valp, nump and w idp
store the latest register value and its timestamp, consisting of
the ordered pair (nump, w idp), known by p. The variable
w idp stores the id of the writer (client) that wrote valp. The
set Known Writes[·]p stores an entry for all nodes q that p
thinks have entered. An entry Known Writes[q]p stores all the
values written to the register that server q has declared to know
about. So, at all times Known Writes[p]p stores the values of
all writes (i) p has heard of through an “update” message from
a client performing a write or (ii) that occur in more than f
entries in Known Writes[·]p.
Algorithm 1: When a server p enters the system, it
broadcasts to all the servers an enter message requesting
information about prior events. When a server q finds out
that node p has entered (or joined or left) the system,
q updates Server Changesq accordingly and sends out an
echo message with information about the system (stored in
Server Changesq) and the shared register (stored in the vari-
able Known Writes[q]q). When node p receives at least f +1
enter-echo messages from joined servers (to make sure at least
one reply is from a correct server), it calculates the number of
replies it needs in order to join as a fraction of the number of
servers it believes are present, i.e., γ · |Presentp|. This value
is stored in the join boundp local variable. Setting γ is a
key challenge in the algorithm as setting it too small might
not propagate updated information, whereas setting it too large
might not guarantee termination of the join. A server q /∈ S0
is considered joined once it has executed line number 130 of
Algorithm 3.
The algorithm sends out messages that are authenticated
with digital signatures. As a result Byzantine servers can send
out incorrect information about everything except for node
ids. Byzantine servers can modify information about anything
sent out in messages of Algorithm 1 subject to the following
restrictions:
• Server Changesp: A Byzantine server p can only send
out subsets of the Server Changesq set for some q that
has entered the system. Server p cannot modify entries
as each entry in this variable contains a server node id
which was digitally signed by the sending server.
• valp, nump and w idp: A Byzantine server can modify
variables valp and nump while sending them out. But it
cannot modify the w idp variable which is the id of the
client that invoked the write or ⊥.
• Known Writes[·]p: A Byzantine server can send out sub-
sets of Known Writes[·]p, but cannot add entries. For
an entry (valq, (numq, w idq)) ∈ Known Writes[q]p,
Byzantine servers can modify the val and num variables
of this entry for node q.
The JoinProtocolp procedure in Algorithm 3 is used by both
newly entered servers and clients to join the system. Once
joined2, servers can reply to read/write queries from clients.
In addition to that, for all nodes p, there exists an in-built
procedure, IsClientp(q) that can check, based on the node id
q, if q is a client or not. This procedure prevents Byzantine
servers from pretending to be clients.
Algorithm 2: Clients might be in the system from the start
or may enter the system at any time. Similar to servers, a
newly entered client p runs the JoinProtocolp procedure in
Algorithm 3 to join the system. Clients treat both read and
write operations in a similar manner. Both operations start with
a read phase, which requests the current value of the register,
using a query message, followed by a write phase, using an
update message. A write operation broadcasts to all servers
the new value it wishes to write, together with a timestamp,
which consists of a sequence number that is one larger than
the largest sequence number it has seen and its id that is used
to break ties. A read operation just broadcasts to all servers
the value it is about to return, keeping its sequence number
as is. As in [6], write-back is needed to ensure the atomicity
of read operations. Both the read phase and the write phase
wait to receive sufficiently many reply messages. The fraction
β calculates the number of replies it needs for the operations
to terminate. as a fraction of the number of nodes it believes
are members, i.e., β · |Membersp|. This value is stored in the
rw bound local variable. Setting β is also a key challenge in
the algorithm as setting it too small might not return/update
correct information from/to the register, whereas setting it too
large might not guarantee termination of the reads and writes.
The fraction β also has to ensure that enough replies from
correct servers are heard so that these replies can efficiently
mask incorrect replies from Byzantine servers.
Algorithm 3: The JoinProtocol() procedure helps newly
entered nodes to join the system. The other procedures in this
algorithm are used to deal with Byzantine servers and their
arbitrary nature. The procedure SetValueTimestamp() checks
and updates the value-timestamp triple ((val, (num,w id))p)
to valid valp if the timestamp of valid valp is higher than the
2Note that joining is not the same as entering. Once a node (client or server)
enters the system, it has to complete running the JoinProtocol subroutine to
become “joined”.
Algorithm 1 ABCC—Code for server p.
In-built Procedure:
IsClient(q) {returns true if q is a client and false if q is a server }
Local Variables:
Server Changes {set that stores information about entering, leaving and joining of servers known by p }
{initially {enter(q) | q ∈ S0} ∪ {join(q) | q ∈ S0}, if p is in the system at time 0 and ∅ otherwise }
join bound {if non-zero, the number of enter-echo messages p should receive before joining; initially 0}
enter echo counter {number of enter-echo messages received so far; initially 0}
enter echo from joined counter {number of enter-echo messages from joined servers received so far; initially 0}
is joined {Boolean to check if p has joined the system; initially false}
val {latest register value known to p; initially ⊥}
num {sequence number of latest value known to p; initially 0}
w id {id of node that wrote latest value known to p; initially ⊥}
Known Writes[] {map from the set of node ids to the powerset of value-timestamp pairs. Initially each entry is ∅}
Derived Variables:
Present = {q | enter(q) ∈ Server Changes ∧ leave(q) 6∈ Server Changes}
valid val = value-timestamp pair with latest timestamp that occurs in at least (f + 1) elements of Known Writes[], else (⊥, (0,⊥))
When ENTERp occurs:
1: Server Changes := Server Changes ∪ {enter(p)}
2: s-bcast 〈“enter”, p〉
3: c-bcast 〈“server-info”, Server Changes〉
When RECEIVEp〈“enter”, q〉 occurs:
4: if IsValidMessage( “enter”, q) then
5: Server Changes := Server Changes ∪ {enter(q)}
6: s-bcast 〈“enter-echo”, Server Changes,
Known Writes[p], is joined, q, p〉
7: c-bcast 〈“server-info”, Server Changes〉
8: end if
When RECEIVEp〈“enter-client”, q〉 occurs:
9: if IsClient(q) then
10: c-bcast 〈“enter-client-echo”, Server Changes,
Known Writes[p],is joined, q, p〉
11: end if
When RECEIVEp〈“enter-echo”, C, K, j, q, r〉
occurs:
12: if IsValidMessage( “enter-echo”, q, r) then
13: Server Changes := Server Changes ∪ C
14: if (j = true) then
15: Known Writes[r] := Known Writes[r] ∪K
16: end if
17: if ¬is joined ∧ (p = q) then
18: call JoinProtocol(j)
19: end if
20: call SetValueTimestamp()
21: end if
When RECEIVEp〈“joined”, q〉 occurs:
22: if IsValidMessage( “joined”, q) then
23: Server Changes := Server Changes
∪{enter(q), join(q)}
24: s-bcast 〈“joined-echo”, q, p〉
25: c-bcast 〈“server-info”, Server Changes〉
26: end if
When RECEIVEp〈“joined-echo”, q, s〉 occurs:
27: if IsValidMessage( “joined-echo”, q, s) then
28: Server Changes :=
Server Changes ∪ {enter(q), join(q)}
29: c-bcast 〈“server-info”, Server Changes〉
30: end if
When LEAVEp occurs:
31: Server Changes := Server Changes ∪ {leave(p)}
32: s-bcast 〈“leave”, p〉
33: c-bcast 〈“server-info”, Server Changes〉
34: halt
When RECEIVEp〈“leave”, q〉 occurs:
35: if IsValidMessage( “leave”, q) then
36: Server Changes := Server Changes ∪ {leave(q)}
37: s-bcast 〈“leave-echo”, q, p〉
38: c-bcast 〈“server-info”, Server Changes〉
39: end if
When RECEIVEp〈“leave-echo”, q, s〉 occurs:
40: if IsValidMessage( “leave-echo”, q, s) then
41: Server Changes := Server Changes ∪ {leave(q)}
42: c-bcast 〈“server-info”, Server Changes〉
43: end if
When RECEIVEp〈“query”, rt, q〉 occurs:
44: if is joined ∧ IsClient(q) then
45: c-bcast 〈“reply”, Known Writes[p], rt, q, p〉
46: end if
When RECEIVEp〈“update”, (v, s, i), wt, q〉 occurs:
47: if IsClient(q) then
48: if (s, i) > (num,w id) then
49: (val, num,w id) := (v, s, i)
50: Known Writes[p] := Known Writes[p]∪
{(val, num,w id)}
51: end if
52: if is joined then
53: c-bcast 〈“ack”, wt, q, p〉
54: end if
55: s-bcast 〈“update-echo”, Known Writes[p], p 〉
56: end if
When RECEIVEp〈“update-echo”, K, s〉 occurs:
57: Known Writes[s] := Known Writes[s] ∪K
58: call SetValueTimestamp()
Algorithm 2 ABCC—Code for client, p.
In-built Procedure:
IsClient(q) {returns true if q is a client and false if q is a server }
Local Variables:
Server Changes {set that stores information about entering, leaving and joining of servers known by p }
{initially {enter(q) | q ∈ S0} ∪ {join(q) | q ∈ S0}, if p is in the system at time 0 and ∅ otherwise }
enter echo counter {number of enter-echo messages received so far; initially 0}
enter echo from joined counter {number of enter-echo messages from joined servers received so far; initially 0}
is joined {Boolean to check if p has joined the system; initially false}
val {latest register value known to p; initially ⊥}
num {sequence number of latest value known to p; initially 0}
w id {id of node that wrote latest value known to p; initially ⊥}
Known Writes[] {map from set of node ids to the powerset of value-timestamp pairs. Initially each entry is ∅}
temp {temporary storage for the value being read or written; initially 0}
tag {used to uniquely identify read and write phases of an operation; initially 0}
rw bound {the number of replies/acks p should receive before finishing a read/write phase; initially 0}
rw counter {the number of replies/acks received so far for a read/write phase; initially 0}
rp pending {Boolean indicating whether a read phase is in progress; initially false}
wp pending {Boolean indicating whether a write phase is in progress; initially false}
read pending {Boolean indicating whether a read is in progress; initially false}
write pending {Boolean indicating whether a write is in progress; initially false}
Derived Variables:
Present = {q | enter(q) ∈ Server Changes ∧ leave(q) 6∈ Server Changes}
Members = {q | join(q) ∈ Server Changes ∧ leave(q) 6∈ Server Changes}
valid val = value-timestamp pair with latest timestamp that occurs in at least (f + 1) elements of Known Writes[], else (⊥, (0,⊥))
When ENTERp occurs:
59: s-bcast 〈“enter-client”, p〉
When RECEIVEp〈“enter-client-echo”, C, K, j, q, r〉 occurs:
60: if IsValidMessage( “enter-client-echo”, q)
∧ (p = q) then
61: Server Changes := Server Changes ∪ C
62: if (j = true) then
63: Known Writes[r] := Known Writes[r] ∪K
64: end if
65: if ¬is joined ∧ (p = q) then
66: call JoinProtocol(j)
67: end if
68: end if
69: call SetValueTimestamp()
When RECEIVEp〈“server-info”, C〉 occurs:
70: Server Changes := Server Changes ∪ C
Procedure BeginReadPhase()
71: tag++
72: s-bcast 〈“query”, tag, p〉
73: rw bound := β · |Members|
74: rw counter := 0
75: rp pending := true
When RECEIVEp〈“reply”, K, rt, q, s〉 occurs:
76: if IsValidMessage( “reply”, q, rt, s) then
77: if rp pending ∧ (rt = tag) ∧ (q = p) then
78: rw counter++
79: Known Writes[s] := Known Writes[s] ∪K
80: if rw counter ≥ rw bound then
81: call SetValueTimestamp()
82: rp pending := false
83: call BeginWritePhase()
84: end if
85: end if
86: end if
Procedure BeginWritePhase()
87: if write pending then
88: val := temp
89: num++
90: w id := p
91: end if
92: if read pending then
93: temp := val
94: end if
95: s-bcast 〈“update”, (temp, num,w id),tag, p〉
96: rw bound := β · |Members|
97: rw counter := 0
98: wp pending := true
When RECEIVEp〈“ack”, wt, q, s〉 occurs:
99: if IsValidMessage( “ack”, q, wt, s) then
100: if wp pending ∧ (wt = tag) ∧ (q = p) then
101: rw counter++
102: if rw counter ≥ rw bound then
103: wp pending := false
104: if read pending then
105: read pending := false
106: generate RETURN(temp) response
107: end if
108: if write pending then
109: write pending := false
110: generate ACK response
111: end if
112: end if
113: end if
114: end if
When LEAVEp occurs:
115: halt
latest known (num,w id)p pair. The variable valid valp is
necessary to make sure that before writing any value (learned
from other servers) to the register, the value was seen by at
least f + 1 servers. A Byzantine server p may send out more
than one reply for a given message or keep replying after it
has sent out a leavep message. The three IsValidMessage()
procedures deal with these situations. They check to make
sure that only one reply from each server for a message is
processed by all nodes. They also check whether the sender q
has already sent a leaveq message. Reads and writes invoked
by Byzantine servers are ignored by correct servers by the
IsClient() checks on Lines 44 and 47 in Algorithm 1.
The correctness of ABCC relies on the system parameters
α, f , and NSmin satisfying the following constraints, for some
choice of algorithm parameters β and γ:
α ≤ 1− 2−1/4 ≈ 0.159 (1)
1 ≤ (1− α)3NSmin − 2f (2)
γ ≥ 1 + 2f
(1− α)3NSmin +
(1 + α)3
(1− α)3 − 1 (3)
γ ≤ (1− α)
3
(1 + α)3
− f
(1 + α)3NSmin
(4)
β ≤ (1− α)
3
(1 + α)2
− f
(1 + α)2NSmin
(5)
β >
(1 + α)5 − 1 + 2f/NSmin
(1− α)4 − f/NSmin (6)
β >
(1 + α)3 − (1− α)3 + 1 + (1 + 3f)/NSmin
[(2 + 2α+ α2)(1− α)2(1 + α)−2]− 2f/NSmin (7)
Constraint (1) is an upper bound on the churn rate to
ensure that not too many servers can leave the system in
an interval of length 4D. Constraint (2) is a lower bound
on the minimum system size to ensure that at least f + 1
correct servers are in the system throughout an interval of
length 3D encompassing the time a node enters, thus ensuring
that the newly entered node successfully terminates its joining
protocol. Constraint (3) ensures that the join bound fraction,
γ, is large enough such that updated information about the
system is obtained by an entered node before it joins the
system. Constraint (4) ensures that γ is small enough such that
for all entered nodes, a join operation terminates if the entered
node is not faulty and does not leave. Constraint (5) ensures
that the rw bound fraction, β, is small enough such that
termination of reads and writes is guaranteed. Constraints (6)
and (7) ensure that β is large enough such that atomicity is
not violated by read and write operations. Table I gives a few
sets of values for which the above constraints are satisfied.
In all consistent sets of parameter values, the churn rate α is
never more than 0.05 and NSmin > 8.5f . The algorithm can
tolerate any size of f as long as NSmin is proportionally big.
ABCC violates atomicity if Assumption A5 is violated.
system algorithm
parameters parameters
maximum minimum churn join bound rw bound
failures system rate fraction fraction
(f ) size (NSmin) (α) (γ) (β)
1 8 0 N/A 0.86
1 10 0.01 0.82 0.84
1 13 0.02 0.79 0.80
1 190 0.05 0.79 0.80
2 19 0.01 0.80 0.83
2 24 0.02 0.81 0.82
2 347 0.05 0.70 0.77
5 44 0.01 0.80 0.83
5 57 0.02 0.79 0.82
5 826 0.05 0.79 0.82
10 85 0.01 0.80 0.83
10 113 0.02 0.79 0.82
10 1630 0.05 0.79 0.82
100 838 0.01 0.79 0.82
100 1107 0.02 0.79 0.82
100 16015 0.05 0.79 0.82
1000 8360 0.01 0.79 0.82
1000 11042 0.02 0.79 0.82
1000 159935 0.05 0.79 0.82
TABLE I: Values for the parameters that satisfy constraints
(1)–(7).
V. CORRECTNESS PROOF OF ABCC
We will show that ABCC satisfies the properties C1 to C3
listed at the end of Section II. Lemmas 1 through 6 are used to
prove Theorem 2, which states that every client and any correct
server eventually joins, provided it does not crash or leave.
Lemmas 7 through 9 are used to prove Theorem 3, which
states that every operation invoked by a client that remains
active eventually completes. Lemmas 10 through 13 are used
to prove Theorem 4, which states that atomicity is satisfied.
Consider any execution. We begin by bounding the number
of servers that enter during an interval of time and the number
of servers that are present at the end of the interval, as
compared to the number present at the beginning.
Lemma 1. For all i ∈ N and all t ≥ 0, at most ((1 + α)i −
1)NS(t) servers enter during (t, t+Di] and (1−α)iNS(t) ≤
NS(t+Di) ≤ (1 + α)iNS(t).
Proof. The proof is by induction on i and is adapted from [9].
For i = 0 and all t ≥ 0, (t, t + Di] is empty, and hence,
0 = ((1+α)i−1)NS(t) servers enter during this interval and
NS(t+ iD) = NS(t) = (1 + α)iNS(t) = (1− α)iNS(t).
Now let i ≥ 0 and t ≥ 0. Suppose at most ((1+α)i−1)NS(t)
servers enter during (t, t+Di] and (1−α)iNS(t) ≤ NS(t+
Di) ≤ (1 + α)iNS(t).
Algorithm 3 ABCC—Procedures used by client/server p
Procedure JoinProtocol(j)
116: enter echo counter ++
117: if (j = true) ∧ (join bound = 0) then
118: enter echo from joined counter ++
119: if enter echo from joined counter > f then
120: join bound := γ · |Present|
121: end if
122: end if
123: if enter echo counter≥join bound>0 then
124: is joined := true
125: if IsClient(p) then
126: generate JOINEDp response
127: else
128: Server Changes := Server Changes ∪ {join(p)}
129: s-bcast 〈“joined”, p〉
130: c-bcast 〈“server-info”, Server Changes〉
131: end if
132: end if
Procedure SetValueTimestamp()
133: if valid val 6=⊥ then
134: if timestamp of valid val > (num,w id) then
135: (val, num,w id) := valid val
136: Known Writes[p] := Known Writes[p]∪
{(val, num,w id)}
137: end if
138: end if
Procedure IsValidMessage( type, r)
139: if type = (“enter”∨ “joined”∨“leave”) ∧ (leave(r) /∈ Server Changes)
then
140: return true if this is the first type message received from r, else
return false
141: end if
Procedure IsValidMessage( type, q, r)
142: if type = (“enter-echo” ∨ “enter client-echo” ∨
“joined-echo” ∨ “leave-echo”)
∧ (leave(r) /∈ Server Changes) then
143: return true if this is the first type message for q received from r,
else return false
144: end if
Procedure IsValidMessage( type, q, tag, r)
145: if type = (“reply” ∨ “ack”) ∧ (leave(r) /∈ Server Changes) then
146: return true if this is the first type message for q with sequence
tag received from r, else return false
147: end if
Let e ≥ 0 and ` ≥ 0 be the number of servers that enter and
leave, respectively, during (t+Di, t+D(i+1)]. By Assumption
A5, e+ ` ≤ αNS(t+Di), so e, ` ≤ αNS(t+Di) ≤ α(1 +
α)iNS(t). The number of servers that enter during (t, t +
D(i+ 1)] is at most
((1 + α)i − 1)NS(t) + e ≤ ((1 + α)i − 1)NS(t)+
α(1 + α)iNS(t)
= ((1 + α)i+1 − 1)NS(t).
Hence,
NS(t+D(i+ 1)) ≤ NS(t) + ((1 + α)i+1 − 1)NS(t)
= (1 + α)i+1NS(t).
Furthermore,
NS(t+D(i+ 1)) ≥ NS(t+Di)− `
≥ NS(t+Di)− αNS(t+Di)
= (1− α)NS(t+Di) ≥ (1− α)i+1NS(t).
By induction, the claim is true for all i ∈ N.
We are also interested in the number of servers that leave
during an interval of time. The calculation of the maximum
number of servers that leave during an interval is complicated
by the possibility of servers entering during the interval,
allowing additional servers to leave.
Lemma 2. For α > 0, all nonnegative integers i ≤
−1/ log2(1 − α) and every time t ≥ 0, at most (1 − (1 −
α)i)NS(t) servers leave during (t, t+Di].
Proof. The proof is by induction on i and is adapted from [9].
When i = 0, the interval is empty, so 0 = (1−(1−α)0)NS(t)
servers leave during the interval. Now let i ≥ 0, let t ≥ 0, and
suppose at most (1−(1−α)i)NS(t+D) servers leave during
(t+D, t+D(i+ 1)].
Let e ≥ 0 and ` ≥ 0 be the number of servers that enter
and leave, respectively, during (t, t+D]. By Assumption A5,
e+ ` ≤ αNS(t), so ` ≤ αNS(t) and NS(t+D) = NS(t)+
e − ` = NS(t) + (` + e) − 2` ≤ (1 + α)NS(t) − 2`. The
number of servers that leave during (t, t + D(i + 1)] is the
number that leave during (t, t+D] plus the number that leave
during (t+D, t+D(i+ 1)], which is at most
`+ (1− (1− α)i)NS(t+D)
≤ `+ (1− (1− α)i)[(1 + α)NS(t)− 2`]
= (1− (1− α)i)(1 + α)NS(t) + (2(1− α)i − 1)`
≤ (1− (1− α)i)(1 + α)NS(t) + (2(1− α)i − 1)αNS(t)
= (1− (1− α)i+1)NS(t).
Note that 2(1 − α)i − 1 ≥ 0, since i ≤ −1/ log2(1 − α).
By induction, the claim is true for all i ∈ N.
Lemma 3 proves that at least f+1 correct servers are active
throughout any interval of length 3D. This lemma is necessary
to ensure that at all times, an active node (client or server) that
expects replies, hears back from at least f+1 correct servers in
order to mask the bad information sent by Byzantine servers.
Lemma 3. For every t > 0, at least f +1 correct servers are
active throughout [max{0, t− 2D}, t+D].
Proof. Let S be the set of servers present at time t′ =
max{0, t − 2D}, so |S| = NS(t′) ≥ NSmin. Constraint (1)
implies that −1/ log2(1 − α) ≥ 4 ≥ 3. So, by Lemma 2, at
most (1 − (1 − α)3)|S| servers leave during (t′, t + D] and
there are at least (1−α)3|S| servers present throughtout time
interval (t′, t+D]. At any point in time, there are at most f
Byzantine servers in the system. Thus, at least
(1− α)3|S| − f ≥ (1− α)3NSmin − f
correct servers in S are active at time t + D. By Con-
straint (2), (1 − α)3NSmin − f ≥ f + 1, so at least f + 1
correct servers in S are still active at time t+D.
Below, a local variable name is superscripted with t to
denote the value of that variable at time t; e.g., vtp is the value
of node p’s local variable v at time t.
In the analysis, we frequently compare the data in nodes’
Server Changes sets to the set of ENTER, JOINED, and
LEAVE events that have actually occurred. To facilitate this
comparison, we define a set SysInfoI that contains perfect
information about correct servers for the time interval I . For
each server q, let teq , and t
`
q be the times when the events
ENTERq and LEAVEq occur, and let tjq be the time when server
q sends out a joined message. Similarly, for each client q, let
teq , t
j
q , and t
`
q be the times when the events ENTERq , JOINEDq ,
and LEAVEq occur, respectively.
Recall that S0 is the set of servers that were in the system
initially. If q ∈ S0, then we set teq = tjq = 0. Then we have:
SysInfoI = {enter(q) | teq ∈ I} ∪ {join(q) | tjq ∈ I}∪
{leave(q) | t`q ∈ I}.
In particular,
SysInfo[0,0] = {enter(q) | q ∈ S0} ∪ {join(q) | q ∈ S0}.
Since a client or correct server p that is active through-
out [tep, t + D] directly receives all enter, joined, and leave
messages broadcast by active clients or correct servers during
[tep, t], within D time, we have:
Observation 1. For every client and any correct server p and
all times t ≥ tep, if p is active at time t+D, then SysInfo[t
e
p,t] ⊆
Server Changest+Dp .
Let C0 be the set of clients that are in the system initially.
By assumption, for every node p ∈ S0 ∪ C0, SysInfo[0,0] ⊆
Server Changes0p, and hence Observation 1 implies:
Observation 2. For every client and any correct server
p ∈ S0 ∪ C0, if p is active at time t ≥ 0, then
SysInfo[0,max{0,t−D}] ⊆ Server Changestp.
The purpose of Lemmas 4 to 6 show that information
about correct servers entering, joining, and leaving is prop-
agated to active clients and correct servers properly, via the
Server Changes sets.
Lemma 4. Suppose that, at time T ′′, a client or correct server
p /∈ S0 ∪ C0 receives an enter-echo message from a correct
server q sent at time T ′ in reply to an enter message from p.
Let T be any time such that max{0, T ′′ − 2D} ≤ T ≤ tep.
Suppose p is active at time T +2D and q is active throughout
[U, T+D], where U ≤ max{0, T ′′−2D}. Then SysInfo(U,T ] ⊆
Server ChangesT+2Dp .
Proof. The proof is adapted from [9] to include Byzantine
servers. Consider any node r that enters, joins, or leaves at
time tˆ ∈ (U, T ]. Note that q directly receives this event’s
announcement, since q is active throughout (U, T +D], which
contains [tˆ, tˆ+D], the interval during which the announcement
message is in transit. There are two cases, depending on the
time, v, at which q receives this message.
Case 1: v ≤ T ′. Since q receives the enter message from
p at T ′, information about this change to r is in
Server ChangesT
′
q , in the enter-echo message that q
sends to p at time T ′. Thus, this information is in
Server ChangesT
′′
p ⊆ Server ChangesT+2Dp .
Case 2: v > T ′. Messages are not received before they are
sent, so T ′ ≥ tep. Since v ≤ tˆ+D, it follows that v+D ≤
tˆ+2D ≤ T+2D. Thus [v, v+D] is contained in [tep, T+
2D]. Immediately after receiving the announcement about
r, server q broadcasts an echo message in reply. Since p
is active throughout this interval, it directly receives this
echo message.
In both cases, the information about r’s change reaches
p by time T + 2D. It follows that SysInfo(U,T ] ⊆
Server ChangesT+2Dp .
Lemma 5. For every client and any correct server p, if
p is active at time t ≥ tep + 2D, then SysInfo[0,t−D] ⊆
Server Changestp.
Proof. The proof is adapted from [9] to include Byzantine
servers. The proof is by induction on the order in which
nodes enter the system. If p ∈ S0 ∪ C0, then tep = 0,
so SysInfo[0,t−D] ⊆ Server Changestp follows from Observa-
tion 2.
Now consider any node p 6∈ S0 ∪ C0 and suppose that the
claim holds for all nodes that enter earlier than p. Suppose p
is active at time t ≥ tep + 2D. By Lemma 3, there is at least
f +1 servers (let q be one of these) that are active throughout
[max{0, tep−2D}, tep+D]. Server q receives an enter message
from p at some time t′ ∈ [tep, tep+D] and sends an enter-echo
message back to p. This message is received by p at some
time t′′ ∈ [t′, t′ +D].
If q ∈ S0, then SysInfo[0,max{0,t
′−D}] ⊆ Server Changest′q ,
by Observation 2. If q 6∈ S0, then 0 < teq ≤ max{0, tep −
2D}, so teq ≤ tep − 2D. Therefore teq + 2D ≤ tep ≤ t′.
Since q entered earlier than p, it follows from the induction
hypothesis that SysInfo[0,t
′−D] ⊆ Server Changest′q . Thus,
in both cases, SysInfo[0,max{0,t
′−D}] ⊆ Server Changest′q .
At time t′′ ≤ t, p receives the enter-echo message
from q, so SysInfo[0,max{0,t
′−D}] ⊆ Server Changest′′p ⊆
Server Changestp.
Applying Lemma 4 for q, with U = max{0, tep −D}, T =
tep, T
′ = t′ and T ′′ = t′′ implies
SysInfo(max{0,t
′−D},tep] ⊆ Server Changest
e
p+2D
p .
Since t ≥ tep + 2D, Server Changes
tep+2D
p is a subset of
Server Changestp. Observation 1 implies SysInfo
[tep,t−D] ⊆
Server Changestp. Hence, SysInfo
[0,t−D] ⊆ Server Changestp.
Lemma 6. For every client and any correct server p 6∈ S0 ∪
C0, if p joins at time tjp and is active at time t ≥ tjp, then
SysInfo[0,max{0,t−2D}] ⊆ Server Changestp.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the order in which clients
and correct servers join the system. Let p 6∈ S0∪C0 be a client
or correct server that joins at time tjp ≤ t and suppose the claim
holds for all clients and correct servers that join before p. If
t ≥ tep+2D, then the claim follows by Lemma 5. So, suppose
t < tep + 2D.
Before joining, p receives f + 1 enter-echo message from
joined servers in reply to its enter message (Line number 119).
Out of these, at most f can be from Byzantine servers. Thus,
at least one reply is from a correct server. Suppose p receives
the first enter-echo message at time t′′ sent by correct server
q at time t′; tep ≤ t′ ≤ t′′ ≤ tjp. From Lemma 5, we
know that this message from q has a perfect information
about the Server Changest
′−2D set. This in turn means that
it has perfect information about the derived set Presentt
′−2D.
Byzantine servers can only modify the information about the
Server Changes set by sending a subset of its Server Changes
set. So, when node p receives at least one reply is from a
correct server, the incomplete information sent by Byzantine
servers is overshadowed by this one reply from q and thus p
has a perfect information about Presentt
′−2D.
If correct server q ∈ S0, then by Observation 2,
SysInfo[0,max{0,t
′−D}] ⊆ Server Changest′q . Otherwise,
by the induction hypothesis, SysInfo[0,max{0,t
′−2D}] ⊆
Server Changest
′
q , since q joined prior to p and is active at
time t′ ≥ tjq . Note that Server Changest
′
q ⊆ Server Changest
′′
p
⊆ Server Changestp. If t ≤ 2D, then max{0, t−2D} = 0 and
the claim holds.
If t > 2D, then let S be the set of servers present at time
max{0, t′− 2D}; |S| = NS(max{0, t′− 2D}). By Lemma 2
and Constraint (1), at most (1 − (1 − α)3)|S| servers leave
during (max{0, t′−2D}, t′+D]. Since t′′ ≤ t′+D, it follows
that |Presentt′′p | ≥ |S|−(1−(1−α)3)|S| = (1−α)3|S|. Hence,
from lines 120 and 123 of Algorithm 3, p waits until it has
received at least join bound = γ ·|Presentt′′p | ≥ γ ·(1−α)3|S|
enter-echo messages before joining.
By Lemma 1, at most ((1+α)3−1)|S| servers enter during
(max{0, t′− 2D}, t′+D]. Thus, at time t′+D, at most (1+
α)3|S| servers are present, at most f of which are Byzantine.
Hence, the number of enter-echo messages p receives before
joining from servers that were active throughout [max{0, t′−
2D}, t′+D] is join bound minus the total number of server
enters, leaves and faults (as Byzantine servers may not reply
at all), which is at least
γ · (1−α)3|S|− [((1+α)3−1)|S|+(1− (1−α)3)|S|+f ]
= [(1 + γ)(1− α)3 − (1 + α)3]|S| − f
≥ [(1 + γ)(1− α)3 − (1 + α)3]NSmin − f (8)
Rearranging Constraint (3), we get
[(1 + γ)(1− α)3 − (1 + α)3]NSmin − f ≥ f + 1,
so expression (9) is at least f +1. Hence p receives an enter-
echo message at some time T ′′ ≤ tjp from a correct server q′
that is active throughout
[max{0, t′ − 2D}, t′ +D] ⊇ [max{0, t′ − 2D}, t−D].
Let T ′ be the time that q′ sent its enter-echo message in
reply to the enter message from p. Applying Lemma 4 for
q′, with U = max{0, t′ − 2D}, and T = t − 2D gives
SysInfo(max{0,t
′−2D},t−2D] ⊆ Server Changestp.
Thus, we get SysInfo[0,t−2D] = SysInfo[0,max{0,t
′−2D}]∪
SysInfo(max{0,t
′−2D},t−2D] ⊆ Server Changestp.
Lemmas 1 through 6 are used to prove Theorem 2 as
follows:
Theorem 2. Every client and any correct server p 6∈ S0 ∪C0
that is active for at least 2D time after it enters succeeds in
joining.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the order in which clients
and correct servers enter the system. Let p 6∈ S0 ∪ C0 be a
client or correct server that enters at time tep and is active at
time tep+2D. Suppose the claim holds for all client and correct
servers that enter before p.
By Lemma 3, there are f +1 correct servers that are active
throughout [max{tep−2D, 0}, tep+D]. Let q be one such server.
If q ∈ S0, then q joins at time 0. If not, then teq ≤ tep − 2D,
so, by the induction hypothesis, q joins by time teq+2D ≤ tep.
Since q is active at time tep+D, it receives the enter message
from p during [tep, t
e
p + D] and sends an enter-echo message
in reply. Since p is active at time tep + 2D, it receives the
enter-echo message from q by time tep + 2D. Hence, by time
tep + 2D, p receives at least one enter-echo message from a
correct joined server in reply to its enter message.
Suppose the first enter-echo message p receives from a
correct joined server in reply to its enter message is sent
by server q′ at time t′ and received by p at time t′′. By
Lemma 6, SysInfo[0,max{0,t
′−2D}] ⊆ Server Changest′q′ ⊆
Server Changest
′′
p .
Let S be the set of servers present at time max{0, t′−2D}.
Since t′′ ≤ t′ + D, it follows from Lemma 1 that at most
((1 + α)3 − 1)|S| servers enter during (max{0, t′ − 2D}, t′′].
Thus, |Presentt′′p | ≤ |S| + ((1 + α)3 − 1)|S| = (1 + α)3|S|.
From line 120 in Algorithm 3, it follows that join bound ≤
γ · (1 + α)3|S|.
By Lemma 2 and Constraint (1), at most (1− (1−α)3)|S|
servers leave during (max{0, t′ − 2D}, t′ + D]. At most f
servers are Byzantine at t′ +D. Since tep ≤ t′ ≤ tep +D, the
servers in S that do not leave during (max{0, t′ − 2D}, t′ +
D] and are not Byzantine at t′ + D are active throughout
[tep, t
e
p+D] and send enter-echo messages in reply to p’s enter
message. By time tep + 2D, p receives all these enter-echo
messages. There are at least
|S| − (1− (1− α)3)|S| − f = (1− α)3|S| − f
such enter-echo messages. By Constraint (4),
(1− α)3
(1 + α)3
− f
(1 + α)3NSmin
≥ γ,
so the value of join bound is at most
γ · (1 + α)3|S| ≤
(
(1− α)3
(1 + α)3
− f
(1 + α)3NSmin
)
· (1 + α)3|S| = (1− α)3|S| − f.
Thus, by time tep + 2D, the condition in line 123 of
Algorithm 3 holds and node p joins.
Next, we show that all read and write operations terminate.
Specifically, we show that the number of replies for which an
operation waits is at most the number that it is guaranteed to
receive.
Since enter(q) is added to Server Changesp whenever
join(q) is, for server q, we get the following observation.
Observation 3. For every time t ≥ 0 and every client p that
is active at time t, Memberstp ⊆ Presenttp.
Lemma 7 relates an active node’s (client or correct server)
current estimate of the number of servers present to the number
of servers that were present in the system 2D time units
earlier. Lemma 8 relates an active client’s current estimate
of the number of servers that are members to the number of
servers that were present in the system 4D time units earlier.
The lower bounds stated in these lemmas had to take into
consideration that Byzantine servers may enter the system and
never send a message and yet affect the system size. This
scenario is impossible in the case of crash failures.
Lemma 7. For every node p that is either a client or a correct
server and for every time t ≥ tjp at which p is active,
(1− α)2 ·N(max{0, t− 2D})− f ≤ |Presenttp|
≤ (1 + α)2 ·N(max{0, t− 2D}).
Proof. The proof is adapted from [9] to include f
Byzantine servers in the lower bound. By Lemma 6,
SysInfo[0,max{0,t−2D}] ⊆ Server Changestp. Thus Presenttp
contains all nodes that are present at time max{0, t−2D}, plus
any nodes that enter in (max{0, t−2D}, t] which p has learned
about, minus any nodes that leave in (max{0, t−2D}, t] which
p has learned about. Then, by Lemma 1,
|Presenttp| ≤
NS(max{0, t−2D})+((1+α)2−1) ·NS(max{0, t−2D})
= (1 + α)2 ·NS(max{0, t− 2D}).
Similarly, by Lemma 2 and Constraint (1),
|Presenttp| ≥
NS(max{0, t−2D})− (1− (1−α)2) ·NS(max{0, t−2D})
= (1− α)2 ·NS(max{0, t− 2D}).
Lemma 8. For every client p and every time t ≥ tjp at which
p is active,
(1− α)4 ·NS(max{0, t− 4D})− f ≤ |Memberstp|
≤ (1 + α)4 ·NS(max{0, t− 4D}).
Proof. The proof is adapted from [9] to include f
Byzantine servers in the lower bound. By Lemma 6,
SysInfo[0,max{0,t−2D}] ⊆ Server Changestp and, by Theo-
rem 2, every node that enters by time max{0, t − 4D} joins
by time max{0, t − 2D} if it is still active. Thus Memberstp
contains all nodes that are present at time max{0, t − 4D}
plus any nodes that enter in (max{0, t−4D}, t] which p learns
have joined, minus any nodes that leave in (max{0, t−4D}, t]
which p learns have left. Then, by Lemma 1,
|Memberstp| ≤
NS(max{0, t−4D})+((1+α)4−1) ·NS(max{0, t−4D})
= (1 + α)4 ·NS(max{0, t− 4D}).
Similarly, by Lemma 2 and Constraint (1),
|Memberstp| ≥
NS(max{0, t−2D})− (1− (1−α)4) ·NS(max{0, t−4D})
= (1− α)4 ·NS(max{0, t− 4D}).
Lemma 9 proves a lower bound on the number of servers
that reply to a client’s query or update message.
Lemma 9. If a client or correct server p is active at time
t ≥ tjp, then the number of correct servers that are joined by
time t and are still active at time t+D is at least
[
(1−α)3
(1+α)2
]
·
|Presenttp| − f .
Proof. By Lemma 2 and Constraint (1), the maximum number
of servers that leave during (max{0, t−2D}, t+D] is at most
(1− (1−α)3) ·NS(max{0, t− 2D}). Thus, there are at least
NS(max{0, t−2D})−(1−(1−α)3)·NS(max{0, t−2D})−f
= [(1− α)3] ·NS(max{0, t− 2D})− f
correct servers that were present at time max{0, t − 2D}
and are still active at time t + D. This number is bounded
below by
[
(1−α)3
(1+α)2
]
· |Presenttp| − f since, by Lemma 7,
NS(max{0, t− 2D}) ≥ |Presenttp|/(1 +α)2. By Theorem 2,
all of these servers are joined by time t.
Lemmas 7 through 9 are used to prove the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. Every read or write operation invoked by a client
that remains active completes.
Proof. Each operation consists of a read phase and a write
phase. We show that each phase terminates within 2D time,
provided the client remains active (does not crash or leave).
Consider a phase of an operation by client p that starts at
time t. Every correct server that joins by time t and is still
active at time t+D receives p’s query or update message and
replies with a reply message or an ack message by time t+D.
By Lemma 9, there are at least
[
(1−α)3
(1+α)2
]
· |Presenttp| − f such
servers.
From Constraint (5), Lemma 7 and Observation 3,[
(1− α)3
(1 + α)2
]
· |Presenttp| − f ≥ β · |Presenttp|
≥ β · |Memberstp| = rw boundtp.
Thus, by time t+ 2D, p receives sufficiently many replies or
ack messages to complete the phase.
Now we prove atomicity of the ABCC algorithm. Let T be
the set of read operations that complete and write operations
that execute line 95 of Algorithm 2. For any node p, let
tstp = (num
t
p, w id
t
p) denote the timestamp of the latest value
known to node p that is recorded in its Known Writes[p]p vari-
able. Note that new timestamps are created by write operations
(on lines 89-90 of Algorithm 2) and are sent via enter-echo,
update, and update-echo messages. Initially, ts0p = (0,⊥) for
all nodes p.
For any operation o in T by client p, the timestamp of its
read phase, tsrp(o), is tstp, where t is the end of its read phase
(i.e., when the condition on line 80 of Algorithm 2 evaluates to
true). The timestamp of its write phase, tswp(o), is tstp, where
t is the beginning of its write phase (i.e., when it s-bcasts on
line 95 of Algorithm 2). The timestamp of a read operation
in T is the timestamp of its read phase. The timestamp of a
write operation in T is the timestamp of its write phase.
Note that w id is equal to p and num is set to one greater
than the largest sequence number occurring in at least f + 1
replies observed during an operation’s read phase. This implies
the next observation:
Observation 4. Each write operation in T has a unique
timestamp.
The next observation follows by a simple induction, since
every timestamp other than (0,⊥) comes from Lines 89-90 of
Algorithm 2.
Observation 5. Consider any read op1 in T . If the timestamp
of a read op1 is (0,⊥), then op1 returns ⊥. Otherwise, there
is a write op2 in T such that ts(op1) = ts(op2) and the value
returned by op1 equals the value written by op2.
If a read operation op1 returns the value written by a write
operation op2, then we say that op1 reads from op2.
Lemmas 10 through 13 show that information written in
the write phase of an operation propagates properly through
the system. It is very important that at every step, the algo-
rithm ensures that outdated information or wrong informa-
tion sent by Byzantine servers does not corrupt the state of
the replicated register. The IsValidMessage() procedure helps
mask two types of bad behavior (multiple replies and replies
sent after announcing a leave). The variables valid valp and
Known Writes[]p help mask (bad) replies from Byzantine
servers. These lemmas are analogous to the Lemmas 4 to 6 re-
garding the propagation of information about ENTER, JOINED,
and LEAVE events.
Lemma 10. If o is an operation in T whose write phase w
starts at tw, correct server p is active at time t ≥ tw + D,
and tep ≤ tw, then tstp ≥ tswp(o).
Proof. Since server p is active throughout [tw, tw + D], it
directly receives the update message s-bcast by w at time tw.
Hence, from lines 48–50 of Algorithm 1, tstp ≥ tswp(o).
Lemma 11. Suppose a correct server p 6∈ S0 receives (f +1)
enter-echo messages from correct servers by time t′′. Let the
f + 1st enter-echo message from a correct server be received
from q that sends it at time t′ in reply to an enter message from
p. If o is an operation whose write phase w starts at tw, p is
active at time t ≥ max{t′′, tw + 2D}, and the f + 1 correct
servers that send enter-echo messages are active throughout
[tw, tw +D], then tstp ≥ tswp(o).
Proof. By Lemma 3, there are at least f + 1 correct joined
servers that are active throughout [tw, tw + D]. Since q is
active throughout [tw, tw+D], it receives the update message
from w at some time tˆ ∈ [tw, tw + D], so tstˆq ≥ tswp(o).
At time t′′ ≤ t, p receives the enter-echo sent by q at time
t′. By the above argument, all f earlier enter-echo messages
have timestamp ≥ tswp(o). So, the value of the timestamp in
valid valp and in Known Writes[p]p is set to ≥ tswp(o). So
tstp ≥ tst
′′
p ≥ tst
′
q . If t
′ ≥ tˆ, then tst′q ≥ tstˆq , so tstp ≥ tswp(o).
If tˆ > t′, then q sends an update-echo at time tˆ ≤ tw + D,
and p receives it by time tˆ + D ≤ tw + 2D ≤ t. The same
argument works for the other f correct, active servers in the
system. Thus the timestamp of the variable valid valp and
Known Writes[p]p is either the timestamp of w or of a later
write. Thus, tstp ≥ tstˆq ≥ tswp(o).
Lemma 12. If o is an operation in T whose write phase
w starts at tw and correct server p is active at time t ≥
max{tep + 2D, tw +D}, then tstp ≥ tswp(o).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the order in which correct
servers enter the system. Suppose the claim holds for all
correct servers that enter before p. If tep ≤ tw, which is the
case for all p ∈ S0, then the claim follows from Lemma 10.
If tw < tep, then by Lemma 3, there are at least f + 1
correct joined servers that are active throughout [max{0, tep−
2D}, tep +D]. These servers receive an enter message from p
and send an enter-echo message containing tst
′
q back to p. Let
q be the server whose enter-echo is the (f + 1)th enter-echo
from a correct joined server to reach p. Let server q receive
the enter message from p at some time t′ ∈ [tep, tep +D]. The
enter-echo message sent by q is received by p at some time
t′′ ≤ t′ +D ≤ tep + 2D ≤ t. So, the value of the timestamp
in valid valp and in turn Known Writes[p]p for p is set to
tstp ≥ tst
′′
p ≥ tst
′
q
The first case is when tw ≥ max{0, tep − 2D}. Since tw +
D < tep +D, it follows that the f + 1 correct joined servers
including q are active throughout [tw, tw + D]. Furthermore,
t ≥ tep+2D ≥ max{t′′, tw+2D}. Hence, Lemma 11 implies
that tstp ≥ tswp(o).
The second case is when tw < max{0, tep − 2D}. Since
tw ≥ 0, it follows that tep−2D > 0, teq ≤ max{0, tep−2D} =
tep − 2D, and tw < tep − 2D ≤ t′ − 2D, so t′ ≥ max{teq +
2D, tw+D}. Note that q is active at time t′ and q enters before
p, so, by the induction hypothesis, tst
′
q ≥ tswp(o). The above
argument is true for all the other f correct joined servers that
p hears from. Hence, tstp ≥ tswp(o).
Lemma 13. If o is an operation in T whose write phase starts
at tw, correct server p 6∈ S0 joins at time tjp, and p is active
at time t ≥ max{tjp, tw + 2D}, then tstp ≥ tswp(o).
Proof. The proof is adapted from [9] to tolerate f Byzantine
servers. The proof is by induction on the order in which servers
enter the system. Suppose the claim holds for all servers that
join before p. If t ≥ tep + 2D, then the claim follows by
Lemma 12. So, suppose t < tep + 2D. If t
e
p ≤ tw, then the
claim follows by Lemma 10. So, suppose tw < tep.
Before p joins, it receives an enter-echo message from a
joined server in reply to its enter message. Suppose p first
receives such an enter-echo message at time t′′ and this enter-
echo was sent by q at time t′. Then t′′ ≤ tjp ≤ t and tst
′
q ≤
tst
′′
p ≤ tstp.
Now we prove that p receives an enter-echo message from
a server q′ that is active throughout [max{0, t′−2D}, t′+D].
Let S be the set of servers present at time max{0, t′−2D}, so
|S| = NS(max{0, t′−2D}). By Lemma 2 and Constraint (1),
at most (1 − (1 − α)3)|S| servers leave during (max{0, t′ −
2D}, t′+D]. Since t′′ ≤ t′+D, it follows that |Presentt′′p | ≥
|S| − (1− (1−α)3)|S| = (1−α)3|S|. Hence, from lines 120
and 123 of Algorithm 3, p waits until it has received at least
join bound = γ · |Presentt′′p | ≥ γ · (1 − α)3|S| enter-echo
messages before joining.
Hence, the number of enter-echo messages p receives before
joining from servers that were active throughout [max{0, t′−
2D}, t′+D] is join bound minus the total number of server
enters, leaves and faults (as Byzantine servers may not reply
at all), which is at least
γ · (1−α)3|S|− [((1+α)3−1)|S|+(1− (1−α)3)|S|+f ]
= [(1 + γ)(1− α)3 − (1 + α)3]|S| − f
≥ [(1 + γ)(1− α)3 − (1 + α)3]NSmin − f (9)
Rearranging Constraint (3), we get
[(1 + γ)(1− α)3 − (1 + α)3]NSmin − f ≥ f + 1,
so expression (9) is at least f +1. Hence p receives an enter-
echo message at some time T ′′ ≤ tjp from a correct server q′
that is active throughout
[max{0, t′ − 2D}, t′ +D] ⊇ [max{0, t′ − 2D}, t−D].
Let T ′ be the time that q′ sent its enter-echo message in reply
to the enter message from p. Then tsT
′
q′ ≤ tsT
′′
p ≤ tstp.
Note that tw < tep ≤ t′ so tw + D ≤ t′ + D. If tw ≥
max{0, t′ − 2D}, then q′ is active throughout [tw, tw + D].
Since t ≥ max{T ′′, tw + 2D}, it follows by Lemma 11 that
tstp ≥ tswp(o). So, suppose tw < max{0, t′ − 2D}.
Since tw ≥ 0, it follows that t′ > tw + 2D. If q ∈ S0, then
teq = 0 ≤ tw, so, by Lemma 10, tst
′
q ≥ tswp(o). If q 6∈ S0,
then, by the induction hypothesis, tst
′
q ≥ tswp(o), since q joins
at time tjq < t
j
p ≤ t′. Thus, in both cases, tstp ≥ tswp(o).
Lemmas 10 through 13 are used to prove Lemma 14, which
is the key lemma for proving atomicity of ABCC. It shows
that for two non-overlapping operations, the timestamp of the
read phase of the latter operation is at least as large as the
timestamp of the write phase of the former.
Lemma 14. For any two operations op1 and op2 in T , if op1
finishes before op2 starts, then tswp(op1) ≤ tsrp(op2).
Proof. Let p1 be the client that invokes op1, let w denote
the write phase of op1, let tw be the start time of w, and let
τw = ts
wp(op1) = ts
tw
p1 . Similarly, let p2 be the client that
invokes op2, let r denote the read phase of op2, let tr be the
start time of r, and let τr = tsrp(op2) = tstrp2 .
Let Qw be the set of servers that p1 hears from during w
(i.e., that sent messages causing p1 to increment rw counter
on line 101 of Algorithm 2) and Qr be the set of servers
that p2 hears from during r (i.e., that sent messages causing
p2 to increment rw counter on line 78 of Algorithm 2). Let
Pw = |Presenttwp1 | and Mw = |Memberstwp1 | be the sizes of
the Present and Members sets belonging to p1 at time tw, and
Pr = |Presenttrp2 | and Mr = |Memberstrp2 | be the sizes of
the Present and Members sets belonging to p2 at time tr.
Case I: tr > tw + 2D. We start by showing that there exists
f + 1 correct servers in Qr such that tjq ≤ tr − 2D.
Each server q ∈ Qr receives and responds to r’s query,
so q is joined by time tr + D. By Theorem 2, the number
of servers that can join during (tr − 2D, tr + D] is at
most the number of servers that can enter in (max{0, tr −
4D}, tr + D]. By Lemma 1, the number of servers that
can enter during (max{0, tr − 4D}, tr + D] is at most
((1 + α)5 − 1) · NS(max{0, tr − 4D}). By Lemma 8,
(1− α)4NS(max{0, tr − 4D})− f ≤Mr.
From the code and Constraint (6), it follows that
|Qr| ≥ βMr >
[
(1 + α)5 − 1 + 2f/NSmin
(1− α)4 − f/NSmin
]
·Mr
≥
[
(1 + α)5 − 1 + 2f/NSmin
(1− α)4 − f/NSmin
]
· ((1− α)4NS(max{0, tr − 4D})− f)
≥ [(1 + α)5 − 1] ·NS(max{0, tr − 4D}) + 2f
which is 2f + 1 more than the maximum number of servers
that can enter in (max{0, tr − 4D}, tr + D). At most f of
these can be Byzantine. Thus, at least f +1 correct servers in
Qr join by time tr − 2D.
Suppose correct server q ∈ Qr receives r’s query message
at time t′ ≥ tr ≥ tw + 2D. If q ∈ S0, then tjq = 0 ≤ tw, so,
by Lemma 10, tst
′
q ≥ tswp(op1) = τw. Otherwise, q 6∈ S0, so
0 < tjq ≤ tr − 2D < t′. Since tw + 2D < tr ≤ t′, Lemma 13
implies that tst
′
q ≥ tswp(op1) = τw. In either case, q responds
to r’s query message with a timestamp at least as large as τw
and, hence, τr ≥ τw.
Case II: tr ≤ tw+2D. Let J = {p | tjp < tr and p is an active
server at time tr} ∪ {p | tr ≤ tjp ≤ tr +D}, which contains
the set of all servers that reply to r’s query. By Theorem 2, all
correct servers that are present at time tr − 2D join by time
tr if they remain active. Therefore all servers in J are either
active at time max{0, tr − 2D} or enter during (max{0, tr −
2D}, tr +D]. By Lemma 1, |J | ≤ (1 + α)3NS(max{0, tr −
2D}).
Let K be the set of all servers that are present at time
max{0, tr − 2D} and do not leave during (max{0, tr −
2D}, tr + D]. Note that K contains all the servers in Qw
that do not leave during [tw, tr + D] ⊆ [max{0, tr −
2D}, tr + D]. By Lemma 2 and Constraint (1), at most
(1 − (1 − α)3)NS(max{0, tr − 2D}) servers leave during
[max{0, tr − 2D}, tr +D].
From the code, |Qr| ≥ βMr and, by Lemma 8, Mr ≥
(1− α)4NS(max{0, tr − 4D})− f . So,
|Qr| ≥ β
[
(1− α)4NS(max{0, tr − 4D})− f
]
.
Similarly,
|Qw| ≥ βMw ≥ β
[
(1− α)4NS(max{0, tw − 4D})− f
]
Therefore, the size of K is at least
|K| ≥ |Qw| − (1− (1− α)3)NS(max{0, tr − 2D})− f
≥ β [(1− α)4NS(max{0, tw − 4D})− f]
− (1− (1− α)3)NS(max{0, tr − 2D})− f.
Since tr − tw ≤ 2D, it follows that max{0, tr − 4D} −
max{0, tw − 4D} ≤ 2D. By Lemma 1, NS(max{0, tr −
4D}) ≤ (1+α)2 ·NS(max{0, tw−4D}). Thus we can replace
NS(max{0, tw−4D}) in the above expression with (1+α)−2·
NS(max{0, tr − 4D}) and get the following expression for
|Qr|+ |K|:
|Qr|+ |K|
≥ β[(1− α)4NS(max{0, tr − 4D})− f ]
+ β[(1− α)4(1 + α)−2NS(max{0, tr − 4D})− f ]
− (1− (1− α)3)NS(max{0, tr − 2D})− f
= β[(1− α)4(1 + α)−2(2 + 2α+ α2)NS(max{0, tr − 4D})− 2f ]
− (1− (1− α)3)NS(max{0, tr − 2D})− f.
By Lemma 1,
NS(max{0, tr − 4D}) ≥ (1− α)−2NS(max{0, tr − 2D}).
Thus,
|Qr|+ |K| ≥ β[(1− α)2(1 + α)−2
(2 + 2α+ α2)NS(max{0, tr − 2D})− 2f ]
− (1− (1− α)3)NS(max{0, tr − 2D})− f
By Constraint (7),
β >
(1 + α)3 − (1− α)3 + 1 + (1 + 3f)/NSmin
[(2 + 2α+ α2)(1− α)2(1 + α)−2]− 2f/NSmin
Let Ntr2D = NS(max{0, tr − 2D}) So,
|Qr|+ |K|
≥

(
(1 + α)3 − (1− α)3 + 1 + (1+3f)NSmin
)
((2 + 2α+ α2)(1− α)2(1 + α)−2)− 2f/NSmin

·
(
(2 + 2α+ α2)(1− α)2(1 + α)−2 − 2f
Ntr2D
)
Ntr2D
− (1− (1− α)3)]Ntr2D − f
Since, Ntr2D ≥ NSmin, we get
|Qr|+ |K|
≥ ((1 + α)3 − (1− α)3 + 1 + (1 + 3f)/NSmin)Ntr2D
− f − (1− (1− α)3)]Ntr2D − f
≥ (1 + α)3Ntr2D + 2f + 1 ≥ |J |+ 2f + 1.
This implies that the intersection of K and Qr has at least
2f +1 servers. For each server p in the intersection, tsp ≥ τw
when p sends its reply to r. Since at most f servers can be
Byzantine, there are at least f + 1 correct servers that reply
with tsp ≥ τw. Thus the timestamp of valid valp on Line
number 133 is ≥ τw, thus, τw ≤ τr.
The proof of Theorem 4 uses Lemma 14 to show that
the timestamps of two non-overlapping operations respect real
time ordering and completes the proof of atomicity.
Theorem 4. ABCC ensures atomicity.
Proof. This proof is taken from from Theorem 23 in [9]. We
show that, for every execution, there is a total order on the set
of all completed read operations and all write operations that
execute Line 95 of Algorithm 2 such that every read returns
the value of the latest preceding write (or the initial value if
there is no preceding write) and, if an operation op1 finishes
before another operation op2 begins, then op1 is ordered before
op2.
We first order the write operations in order of their (unique)
timestamps. Then, we go over all reads in the ordering of the
start times, and place a read with timestamp (0,⊥) at the
beginning of the total order. Place every other read after the
write operation it reads from , and after all the previous reads
that read from this write operation. By the Observation 5, every
read in the total order returns the value of the latest preceding
write (or ⊥ if there is no preceding write).
We show that the total order respects the real-time order of
non-overlapping operations in the execution. Let op1 and op2
be two operations in T such that op1 finishes before op2 starts.
By the definition of timestamps, ts(op1) ≤ tswp(op1) and
tsrp(op2) ≤ ts(op2). By Lemma 14, tswp(op1) ≤ tsrp(op2).
Therefore, if op2 is a read, then
ts(op1) ≤ ts(op2) (10)
If op2 is a write, then tswp(op2) = tsrp(op2) + 1, and
ts(op1) < ts(op2) (11)
We consider the following cases:
• Suppose op1 and op2 are both writes. By (11), ts(op1) <
ts(op2) and thus the construction orders op1 before op2.
• Suppose op1 is a write and op2 is a read. By (10) and the
construction, op2 is placed after the write op3 that op2
reads from. If ts(op1) = ts(op2) then op1 = op3 and
op2 is placed after op1. If ts(op1) < ts(op2) then op3
is placed after op1 as ts(op1) < ts(op3) and thus op2 is
placed after op1 in the total order.
• Suppose op1 is a read and op2 is a write. By 11,
ts(op1) < ts(op2). Now, either op2 is the first write in the
execution and op1’s timestamp is (0,⊥) or there exists
another write op3 that op1 reads from. If op1’s timestamp
is (0,⊥) then the construction orders op1 before op2.
Otherwise, the construction orders op3 before op2. Since
op1 is ordered after op3 but before any subsequent write,
op1 precedes op2 in the total order.
• Finally, suppose that op1 and op2 are both reads. By 10,
ts(op1) ≤ ts(op2). If op1 and op2 have the same
timestamp, then they are placed after the same write (or
before the first write) and the construction orders them
based on their starting times. Since op1 completes before
op2 starts, the construction places op1 before op2. If op2
has a timestamp greater than that of op1, then ts(op2)
cannot be (0,⊥) and so there is a write operation op3
whose timestamp is greater than that of op1 and equal to
that of op2. The construction places op1 before op3 and
op2 after op3.
Thus, ABCC ensures atomicity.
VI. DISCUSSION
Our paper provides an algorithm that emulates a Byzantine-
tolerant atomic register in a dynamic system (i) where consen-
sus is impossible to solve, (ii) that never stops changing and
(iii) has no upper bound on the system size. We also provide
an impossibility proof that in our model, a uniform algorithm
cannot be implemented.
There are several directions for future work. The values of
α, f and NSmin that satisfy our algorithm are quite restrictive.
It will be nice to see if such restrictions are necessary or if
they can be improved either with a better algorithm or a tighter
correctness analysis.
Currently our model tolerates the most severe end of the
fault severity spectrum and paper [9] considered the most
benign end of the fault severity spectrum. In future, we would
like to to see if our impossibility result extends to the other
failure models?
Our current way of restricting churn relies on the unknown
upper bound D on message delay. An alternative may be to
allow the upper bound on the message delays to be unbounded
and to define the churn rate with respect to messages in
transit. For example, at all times, the number of servers that
can enter/leave the system when any message is in transit at
most α times the system size when the message was sent.
It may be possible to prove that the two models are indeed
equivalent, or to show that the algorithms still work, or can
be modified to work, in the new model.
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